: Jing (respect) in ancient Confucianism can be seen as referring to either a frame of mind or an intentional state that includes the elements of singlemindedness, concentration, seriousness, caution, and a strong sense of responsibility. Hence, it can be seen as a due regard based on the perception of the worth of its object. It is the central element and the germ of li (ritual). A critical comparison is made between jing and the ideas of appraisal respect, recognition respect, (...) and identification respect as discussed in Western ethics. (shrink)

It is argued that shu involves one's identification with another person while one criticizes the latter's perspective based on one's own. A mechanism is proposed for developing this sort of critique, based on some significant Confucian values. Finally, shu is applied to the context of caring actions, and it is shown how it can help to solve some of the problems arising in caring for others.

In personal relationships, we conceive of the related person as an individual who is more than a combination of qualities, a bearer of claims or a role-occupant. She is envisaged as a distinct and irreplaceable particular. We have immediate concerns for her that are not mediated by consideration of principles such as the promotion of welfare or the fulfillment of duty. The aim of my dissertation is to analyze and defend this particularistic concern and show how it is anchored in (...) what I call an engaged perspective. Recent critics of Kantianism and utilitarianism claim that these theories endorse only an objective or impersonal perspective, which ignores the particularity of individuals. I contrast this with an engaged perspective which I explicate by building on insights embodied in the Confucian account of role-ethics in the period 550 B.C.-290 B.C. I argue that although Confucian ethics has been rightly interpreted to stress the way in which social role mediates between relationships, nonetheless its ideal concerns socially-mediated relations of love between individuals. ;I first examine the cardinal Confucian virtue of jen, or loving, and other role virtues such as filial piety, and show how they help create connectedness and mutuality. People are connected when they share their emotional world and care for each other. And they share an exclusive mutuality when they generate a unique history of reciprocation and participate in the common good of their relationship. In addition, particularity functions as a structural factor to govern the caring, reciprocity, and emotions of love. Consequently, an engaged agent considers her beloved and the relationship she is engaged in as irreplaceable particulars. The engaged perspective is a distinctive "we" perspective arising from the awareness of such connectedness and mutuality. I also contrast the engaged perspective with the personal perspective. ;Finally, I analyze the motivational structure of a Confucian agent by examining the influence of propriety, emotions, thinking and will on Confucian agency. This confirms my analysis of the engaged perspective and further informs us about the type of agency required in engagement. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the conception of gender as illustrated in the Analects and the Mencius is basically a functional one that assigns women a domestic role. I show how this conception might imply the exclusion of women from the moral ideal of chun-tzu, which would result in the further subordination of women as wives to men as husbands in the context of the Confucian role system. On the other hand, I show how the Confucian role system can (...) have a positive influence on the status of women through its elements of reciprocity and respect. Finally, I argue that the conception itself is not justified. (shrink)

The concept of yu 欲 is an under-explored concept in the scholarship on early Confucianism. Perhaps due to the focus on the term “the yu of eyes and ears,” a common term in early Chinese philosophy denoting desires for sensual gratification, or on the Daoist stance on desires, many scholars tend to emphasize the negative and the hedonistic connotations of the term. For example, Chad Hansen notes that the early Confucians do not “make desires central in their account of human (...) guidance,”1 and that Confucius uses “desire” “more to describe dispositions that conflict with his favored dao.”2 In the same vein, when many scholars analyze Xunzi’s account of desires they focus on its... (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Ethics and Metaphysics Discussion of Tang's Account of Ethics and Metaphysics Culture Discussion of Tang's Account of Culture Conclusion.